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Abstract 
Economic analysis takes as its defining performance benchmark the pursuit of increases in 
efficiency.  Competition law and industry-specific regulation provide two competing means 
of intervention whereby the pursuit of efficiency can be enhanced.  Ultimately, legislators 
decide how governance of industry interaction will be allocated between these two 
institutional forms.  Whilst competition law can govern interaction in most industries, where 
the underlying economic conditions are sufficiently different, industry-specific regulation 
offers advantages.  However, its weakness is the risk of capture, leading to the subjugation of 
the efficiency end to the pursuit of other objectives.  But if the regulatory institution could be 
bound in some way to pursue an efficiency objective, could the risk of capture be averted? 
New Zealand’s ‘light-handed’ regulation, instituted in 1987, attempted to enshrine the pursuit 
of efficiency into statute, firstly by relying solely upon competition law and contractual 
undertakings, and subsequently creating a regulatory body with an explicit legislated 
efficiency directive.  In practice, however, the inability of a government prioritising efficiency 
to bind its successors to pursue the same objective renders sector strategy, and hence the 
efficiency objective, subject to political capture.   Consequently, inherent systemic instability 
attends the pursuit of the efficiency objective and the institutions overseeing its enforcement.   
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1. Competition or Regulation? 
Economic analysis takes, as its defining performance benchmark, the pursuit of increases in 
efficiency (welfare), measured as the sum of consumer and producer (i.e. total) surplus.  In 
this paradigm, an increase in total surplus is strictly preferable to the status quo or a decrease 
in total surplus.  An action that brings about a greater efficiency increase is therefore strictly 
preferable to one leading to a lesser increase, maintains the status quo, or leads to a decrease.  
In this context, the primary normative objective of law- and policy-making is the promotion 
of economic efficiency via the elimination of market efficiencies (Schmalansee, 1979; Kahn, 
1970; 1975).   
 
Whilst a minority of economists, and many consumer advocates, propose the use of law- and 
policy-making powers principally as a means of achieving distributional objectives 
independent of their effects upon total efficiency (e.g. Feldstein, 1972a; 1972b), their use for 
this purpose is extremely difficult to achieve in practice (Schmalansee, 1979), and possibly 
counter-productive (Kahn, 1975; Peltzman, 1976).  Furthermore, as distributional objectives 
are highly subjective, it is very difficult to adjudge the ‘success’ of any distribution-motivated 
intervention.  By contrast, efficiency is an objective measure that provides a useful 
benchmark for the economic assessment of law- and policy-making performance, even if 
redistribution is a primary consideration.  The Kaldor-Hicks criterion holds that if total 
welfare (efficiency) is greater as a consequence of a law or policy change, then the gains to 
the winners will be greater than the losses incurred by the losers, and the change 
economically justified, irrespective of whether the gains are actually shared (i.e. redistribution 
occurs) (Connolly & Munro, 1999).   
 
Consequently, the pursuit of increased efficiency is broadly accepted as the principal 
economic justification for the enactment of both competition (antitrust) law overseen by 
courts and judges and industry-specific regulation, overseen by regulators and regulatory 
agencies  (Carlton & Perloff, 2005).  In the United States context, since the passing of the 
Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), “regulation and antitrust have 
operated as competing mechanisms to control competition” (Carlton & Picker, 2007:1).  The 
challenge for law- and policy-makers is in determining a balance in the allocation of 
responsibilities between the courts enforcing the generic antitrust obligations of firms and 
regulatory authorities overseeing efficient operation within specific industries where 
underlying economic characteristics predispose them to efficiency limitations, in a manner 
that best promotes the pursuit of increased efficiency.  
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1.1 Courts or Regulators? 
It is far from clear that either the courts or industry-specific regulatory bodies have embedded 
in their legislative underpinnings or operational capacities the ability to take full account of 
all relevant issues of economic efficiency.   
 
Carlton & Picker (2007) suggest that the development of an independent United States 
jurisprudence has enabled economic principles to be increasingly included in judicial 
decision-making, in a manner that is not possible in less-independent industry-specific 
regulation.  However, whilst court-governed processes can give weight to promoting 
increases in economic efficiency, they are constrained in their ability to promote its 
maximisation under the prevailing constraints.  Courts are reactive, responding only to those 
cases and those points of law brought before them.  Judges have no mandate to address 
potentially efficiency-raising issues that industry participants choose not to pursue in 
litigation.  Their decisions thus lead to incremental changes over a small range of issues, 
which are not necessarily the most important from a broader total welfare perspective.   
 
Moreover, even when cases are brought, they are adjudicated by generalist antitrust judges 
who in many cases lack the industry-specific economic knowledge upon which efficiency 
decisions may turn.  Judgement quality is conditional upon the quality of advice available 
(e.g. access of the panel to expert lay members) and the range of issues and accompanying 
analysis presented by the litigants.  The precedents set in jurisprudence also hinge upon the 
economics underpinning the test cases.   Precedents formed upon the basis of underlying 
economic characteristics in one industry may not transfer neatly into industries where 
different underlying economic characteristics prevail.  For example, high fixed and sunk costs 
induce a different form of competitive interaction between industry participants, and different 
efficiency outcomes, than where these costs are low or non-existent.   Whereas competitive 
behaviour favouring a large number of market participants driving price towards marginal 
cost raises efficiency in most industries, where sunk costs are large, injudicious entry and 
pursuit of marginal cost pricing creates, rather than ameliorates, market failure leading to 
associated loss of efficiency (Carlton and Perloff, 2005).   
 
The risks of judicial economic error associated with economically ‘different’ industries – 
predominantly the network industries such as telecommunications, electricity, railways, 
airlines and other transport – suggest that the creation of industry-specific regulators to 
govern industry interaction has the potential to improve decision-making and is indeed a 
rational, efficiency-raising institutional response to the limitations of jurisprudence.   
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Industry-specific regulators in most cases have the requisite economic knowledge to give due 
weight to efficiency considerations.  They can also be given a much broader mandate to 
investigate issues which in their judgement warrant attention.  Rather than being reactive, 
they can be proactive – a power that when applied appropriately can lead to increases in 
efficiency.  Proactive power thus tends towards more radical industry change in regulator-
governed regimes than is observed in antitrust-governed ones, theoretically enabling the 
capture of efficiency gains in a more timely manner than is possible under court-governed 
processes.  
 
However, unlike judges who in most jurisdictions are independent of political processes, 
regulators’ comparative lack of independence exposes them to greater risk of capture, either 
by either the politicians who grant them authority in the first place, or industry participants, 
with whom they are most closely associated in their daily activities, and whose livelihoods 
depend upon the regulator’s decisions (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 
1983).  This predisposes regulatory decisions towards a greater emphasis upon redistributive 
rather than economic efficiency issues.  The measure of a regulatory regime’s effectiveness 
and ability to deliver upon the efficiency objective therefore turns upon firstly the extent to 
which it is charged with the pursuit of economic efficiency, and secondly the regulator’s 
ability to adhere to the efficiency objective in the face of pressures which will inevitably 
come to bear upon it to deviate towards favouring specific redistributive desires.   
 
1.2 Regulation to Increase Competition or Welfare? 
In deciding the optimal allocation of industry governance responsibilities between 
competition law and industry-specific regulation in industries where the underlying economic 
circumstances are sufficiently different, the pertinent question facing policy-makers is 
whether the pursuit of competition is a sufficiently good proxy for the pursuit of increased 
efficiency in those industries for competition law to be sufficient.  If it is not, then industry-
specific regulation charged with the pursuit of increased efficiency would appear to be the 
appropriate institutional form of governance.    
 
Yet in practice, it is common to see regulatory institutions charged principally with increasing 
competition (rather than efficiency) in their relevant industries.  For example, the 
Telecommunications sector of the European Commission Directorate General for 
Competition is charged with ensuring that “national regulators correctly apply the regulatory 
framework so as to promote effective competition” and applying “the general competition 
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rules of the EU Treaty”1.   That is, pursuit of the “means” (competition) of increasing the 
desired “end” (efficiency) has itself become the “end” objective of the regulatory institution 
established to address the inability of competition law to increase efficiency.    
 
If competition law is so inherently ill-suited to adjudicating issues in industries with 
sufficiently different underlying economic circumstances that pursuit of increased efficiency 
can only reasonably be expected to occur under the aegis of an industry-specific regulatory 
body with the freedom to deviate from competition law methods and benchmarks to pursue 
that objective, then why would that regulatory body itself be charged with encouraging and 
enforcing competitive behaviour – the (apparently) identical mandate with which the courts 
are charged?  The seemingly tautological contradiction is resolvable only if it can be 
presumed that the form of competitive interaction in the regulated industry differs so 
substantially from the form of competitive interaction occurring in other industries that 
generic competition law is unable to deliver the desired outcomes.     
 
Specifically, the form of competition pursued in regulated industries cannot be static ‘perfect 
competition’ where it is presumed that the number of participants producing an homogenous 
good is infinite and price is driven down to marginal cost.  Yet few real-world markets, even 
those apparently quite satisfactorily governed by competition law, satisfy the requirements for 
a textbook-style perfectly competitive market.  The general antitrust view is that all markets 
are special, and therefore competition law principles governing industry interaction should 
take theses distinctive characteristics into account (Gaynor & Vogt, 2000).  Separate 
governance will be more efficient, however, if the pattern of competition is sufficiently 
different, consistent and frequently occurring to justify a net economic benefit of 
specialisation over generalisation (Williamson, 1986).  This is likely to occur in industries 
where specific characteristics (e.g. high fixed and sunk costs) result in the emergence of 
distinctively different patterns of competitive interaction (e.g. oligopoly, monopolistic 
competition, dominant firm-competitive fringe) where participants face quite different 
incentives from those associated with perfectly competitive markets (e.g. the dynamic 
incentives associated with a small number of large firms investing very large sums in 
differentiated technologies across time) (Alleman & Rappoport, 2005).   
 
In the longer-run, regardless of the form of the governing institution, the effects upon 
dynamic efficiency from prioritising the ‘wrong’ form of competition may be profoundly 
detrimental.  Short-run entry pursued for or static efficiency purposes without due 
                                                     
1 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/telecommunications/overview_en.html  site accessed 9 June 2009.  
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consideration of long-run dynamic investment and efficiency incentives is counter-productive 
(Hausman, 1999; Crandall, Ingraham & Singer, 2004; Pindyck, 2004; 2005; Guthrie, 2007).  
Greater dynamic efficiency gains may be achieved by preventing, rather than encouraging, 
competitive entry (e.g. regulatory holidays – Gans & King, 2004). Likewise, entry induced by 
the imposition of asymmetric obligations upon the incumbent (e.g. universal service 
obligations distorting price signals and inducing entry by participants with higher costs than 
the incumbent; service-level entry on the basis of arbitrage on regulated access tariffs) is 
unlikely to be either efficiency-raising (Quigley, 2004) or sustainable long-term (e.g. as 
evidenced by the ‘price squeeze literature – Sidak, 2008).   
 
However, introducing industry-specific regulatory bodies to oversee pursuit of competition in 
‘economically different’ industries presupposes that the competitive differences are 
sufficiently well-understood to be translated accurately into the regulatory institution’s 
objectives, its performance is measured against them, and that the ensuing regulatory 
institution will achieve those objectives more efficiently in total than under competition law 
institutions.   Any competition-based regulatory objective therefore must at the very least be 
constrained by an explicit efficiency-based criterion – i.e. at worst, total welfare is at least as 
large as under the counterfactual. If not, there is little economic justification for having a 
separate governance body in the first place – from first principles, competition law 
governance would suffice.   
 
Furthermore, any regulatory obligations imposed on firms, (whether imposed by an industry-
specific regulator or via legislated obligations or even contractual deeds with government 
agents) necessarily alter the patterns of competitive interaction observed such that standard 
textbook models of interaction likely provide poor guidance in respect of expectations and 
likely outcomes.  Regulatory-induced competitive interaction will most likely differ quite 
substantially from competitive interaction arising in non-regulated industries.   Likewise, the 
form of regulated competition induced following privatisation of a formerly government-
owned monopoly and concomitant industry deregulation will likely differ substantially from 
that induced when an industry formerly governed under competition law becomes subject to 
industry-specific regulation.   Institutional history will inevitably lead to a path-dependent and 
likely unique pattern of competitive interaction (Howell & Sangekar, 2009). 
 
Moreover, it cannot be simply assumed that it is sufficient to stipulate a regulatory agenda 
pursuing any one nominated form of competition.  Competitive interactions are dynamic 
processes that will necessarily alter over time, as a consequence of both changing strategies 
amongst industry participants as they respond to each others’ actions, and changes in the 
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underlying economic circumstances that give rise to different forms of interaction in the first 
place (e.g. technological innovation altering cost structures).  
 
The efficacy of competition law as a means of governing ‘economically different’ industries 
must therefore be tested against its ability to adjudicate in favour of increased efficiency 
given the distinctions in competitive interaction occurring over time.  The record suggests that 
courts as a generic institution may be ill-equipped overall to take account of such distinctions.  
Sidak (2008) illustrates conflicting decisions arising in different jurisdictions regarding the 
legality of ‘price squeezes’ induced by regulatory duties to deal that would not occur 
normally in an unregulated market.  Economic analysis incorporating the upstream origin of 
the ‘squeeze’ arrives at a different efficiency finding than analysis taking as its starting point 
only the action in the downstream retail product market.  Whilst a sufficiently well-informed 
court may be able to make an efficiency-raising decision, Sidak’s comparison of the range of 
different judgements arrived at by courts in different circuits in the United States and in the 
European Union on essentially the same facts suggests that it is not at all clear that courts in 
all jurisdictions are capable at the current point in time of acting consistently in a manner that 
promotes efficiency given the economic complexities attendant to  the different forms of 
competition induced by regulatory intervention. 
 
1.3 An Institutional Solution? 
Whilst court-based governance is problematic, can governance undertaken by a separate 
regulatory institution in practice achieve a more efficient outcome?  Clearly, it is inconsistent 
to establish such an agency and charge it with promoting and/or enforcing the identical forms 
of competitive interaction that competition law has already been charged with, and shown to 
be inadequate in, addressing.  One of the principal benefits of industry-specific regulation is 
that the regulatory body can be granted discretionary powers not available to the courts (for 
example, to alter the performance benchmarks as the form of competition in the industry 
evolves over time).  Yet it is this very discretion that makes regulation vulnerable to capture 
by vested interests seeking to ensure unduly favourable treatment.  This begs the question of 
whether the risk of capture can be meaningfully reduced by specifying ex ante an explicit 
regulatory objective to take account of efficiency consequences in regulatory actions. 
 
From an economic perspective, if a regulatory agency was charged with an efficiency-based 
objective, and required to report transparently against it, then it might be assumed that the risk 
of regulatory capture by vested interests within the industry would be substantially reduced.  
However, without some further clarification as to the relative weights to be given to the 
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pursuit of dynamic as opposed to static efficiency gains, a risk remains that regulatory capture 
efforts may be exerted towards capturing any regulatory discretion in this regard.  The most 
marked risk in industries with high fixed and sunk costs would be capture resulting in a 
higher weight than optimal being given to static efficiency gains (e.g. arising from price 
regulation or entry occurring in a market being inappropriately encouraged to replicate perfect 
competition when such an objective is unattainable) over dynamic efficiency gains (e.g. 
failing to prevent entry, thereby precluding sufficient incentives being provided to encourage 
investment in additional capacity or new technologies).   Such an outcome would seem most 
likely to occur when a regulator charged with ‘increasing competition’ is insufficiently 
constrained by a concomitant objective to take account of the dynamic efficiency 
consequences of increased competition – for example when priorities for regulatory ‘success’ 
give greater weight to either the number of competitive entrants or their (individual or 
combined) market share (static considerations) than investment-related metrics (dynamic 
considerations).   
 
If, however, it was feasible to construct an efficiency-based regulatory objective that was 
sufficiently clearly articulated and measurable so as to eliminate these sources of capture, 
could industry-specific regulation offer a stable institutional solution to the dilemma of 
governance allocation?  Such a concept has immediate appeal.  In practice, however, unlike 
competition law where the judiciary retains constitutional independence from political 
direction, a regulatory agency is usually a direct agent of political principals, and is subject to 
carrying out its duties only as prescribed in the politically-enacted legislation that gives it 
force. Whilst politicians can once set the regulator’s objective to pursue increased total 
efficiency with a given set of weights favouring dynamic over static gains, as the economic 
literature suggests should result in greatest long-term total efficiency, they also hold the  
power to subsequently alter the objective.   The risk of capture is simply shifted up the 
institutional hierarchy from the regulator to politicians (Williamson, 1996).   
 
Whereas judges and regulators can be held to account by well-informed individuals (who are 
presumably experts in the issues under consideration) on a tightly-defined and transparent set 
of criteria for each and every decision made, generalist politicians are held to account 
infrequently on a plethora of decisions over a vast array of policy areas by the individuals 
least-well informed on the efficiency-based issues on which the industry-specific decisions 
turn – the voting public.  Not only is the focus of capture altered, but the likelihood of it 
occurring and going unchecked is greater.  The greater risk of political capture by vested 
interest groups is precisely why policy agencies such as the OECD advocate strongly for the 
removal of industry-specific regulatory decisions from the ambit of day-to-day generalist 
7/16/2009 -9- 9
political activity.  Yet so long as politicians hold the power to alter the legislated terms under 
which an industry-specific regulatory agency is established, the objective it will pursue and 
the terms under which its performance is monitored and assessed, the agency’s activities are 
subject to deviation from any previously-articulated objectives by its present political 
principals.    
 
By way of illustration, suppose a well-intentioned government did resist the risks of political 
capture sufficiently to use its legislative powers to establish a regulatory agency charged with 
the pursuit of clearly-articulated, weighted and transparent increases in total welfare.  In 
principle, such a regulatory agency should deliver the desired outcome uninhibited.  However, 
as such a government is unable to bind its’ successors, it is quite feasible that its opposition 
may be captured by vested interests opposed to the efficiency-raising objective.  Upon 
obtaining an electoral majority, the new government (former opposition) can simply pass into 
law an alternative regulatory objective.  Even without the need to change the law, the weights 
applied to any discretion given to the regulator (e.g. the balance between static and dynamic 
efficiency) may become subject to political actions (for example, via the appointment of a 
regulator sympathetic to the capturing interests, or the provision of funding becoming 
contingent upon the delivery of alternative (non efficiency-based) outcomes).   
 
Moreover, capture of the regulatory process (such that it deviates from the pursuit of 
increased efficiency to the exclusion of other ends) can occur even without an explicit 
intention being present, simply because multiple objectives become conflated in the 
regulator’s assigned duties.  For example, in the telecommunications industry, regulators have 
frequently been charged with overseeing simultaneous processes of privatisation of former 
government-owned firms and regulating competition amongst the private owner and new 
market participants.  In order to secure an electoral mandate for privatisation, politicians 
typically undertake to require regulators to bind the privatised incumbent with social 
obligations underpinned by redistributive imperatives (e.g. universal service).  The incumbent 
may also be subject to price restraints (e.g. mandatory below-cost prices) designed to transfer 
surpluses presumed to be accumulated by the producer to consumers. Different treatment of 
the incumbent and its competitors via other instruments (e.g. caps, cost-based pricing) that 
constrain profits and alter incentives unequally is also strictly a redistributive imperative as it 
prioritises gains to competitors over gains to the incumbent even when there is no change in  
total welfare (Howell, 2008).  Such imperatives effectively relegate pursuit of efficiency to a 
secondary role in the regulatory agenda, at least in the short-term.   
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Pursuit of redistribution is further elevated in importance if competitive entry arises as a 
consequence of arbitrage based upon politically-mandated regulatory restrictions on the 
incumbent rather than as a consequence of more efficient production processes or welfare-
enhancing product differentiation.  Inappropriate measures of regulatory performance  
conflating pursuit of competition measured solely as competitive entry with pursuit of 
efficiency are therefore more likely to be prioritised by ill-informed politicians who, as agents 
of voters favour the pursuit of competition as an objective simply because ‘evidence’ in the 
form of decreased incumbent market share is very visible in the short-run political (voting) 
horizon, whereas efficiency improvements are less tangible, broadly spread and take time to 
accrue.   
 
1.4 Courts as a Second-Best?  
A feasible institutional solution to the political capture problem might be to place the 
regulatory agency outside the realms of political control – that is, in effect to create a body 
that replicates the constitutional independence of the courts.  However, it is difficult to 
conceive that such a body could be either politically or socially acceptable if it retained the 
same degree of discretion required by, and granted to, regulators without first having 
established a sufficient body of precedents to guide decision-making.  The circularity of the 
argument would appear to suggest that in practice, the new body would simply be a special 
court adjudicating industry-specific matters (for example, the akin to the labour court).    
 
But whilst addressing the limitations inherent in non-specialist judges, specialist courts by 
their very institutional imperatives invoke the same efficiency-limiting criticisms levelled at 
competition law courts – namely the reactive nature of decision-making and judicial inability 
to address potential welfare-enhancing issues unless specifically called upon to do so via a 
case.  If the only substantive difference between the two types of court is specialist judicial 
knowledge and a body of jurisprudence, it begs the question of why such distinctions could 
not in principle be equally well catered for under an expanded competition law mandate 
overseen by the general courts.   
 
In sum, therefore, it would appear that it may be impossible to create a regulatory institution 
where the pursuit of efficiency can be retained as a stable, long-term objective. Whilst court-
based competition law may have shortcomings, unless there is some alternative means of 
restraining politicians from deviating regulatory objectives from the pursuit of increased 
efficiency, it would appear that it offers the best chance of stable, long-term economically 
consistent industry governance.   
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 2. Case Study: The New Zealand Telecommunications Sector 
The lack of stability and robustness of an industry-specific regulatory body charged with 
pursuing increased efficiency in the face of risk of political capture is illustrated by the case 
study of New Zealand’s telecommunications industry governance arrangements from 1984 to 
the present.    
2.1  ‘Light-Handed’ Regulation and Efficiency 
New Zealand led the world in ‘light-handed’ regulation when from 1984, the government 
embarked upon a comprehensive restructuring of the country’s economy under the aegis of a  
clearly articulated objective of increasing economic efficiency and creating “wherever 
possible, a competitive environment in which markets can operate relatively free from 
subsequent intervention by government” (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson & Teece, 1996:1863).  
As part of this process, the Commerce Act 1986 was enacted with the objective of promoting 
competition for the long-term benefit of consumers and the Telecommunications Act 1987 
eschewed industry-specific regulation in favour of generic competition law under the 
provisions of the Commerce Act.   
 
Efficiency considerations were paramount in the choice of institutional mechanisms for 
industry governance.  As a small economy with only a little over 4 million people, New 
Zealand could access economies of scale in the regulatory process itself if a single institution 
governed all commercial activity.   The costs, inflexibility and bureaucratic capture 
weaknesses were explicitly identified as avoidable under a competition law-governed regime 
(MoC/Treasury, 1995; Blanchard, 1995).  Whilst the limitations attendant with non-specialist 
judges existed, it was also clear that New Zealand’s specific economic circumstances – small 
population, low population density, geographical isolation, challenging terrain, thin capital 
markets and historically highly-concentrated industries –posed challenges to the enactment of 
competition law not faced in other jurisdictions (Arnold, Boles de Boer & Evans, 2003).  On 
balance, the establishment of a single institution to capture scale economies as well as ensure 
consistency in application was favoured.  However, Part IV of the Commerce Act explicitly 
provided for the government to impose price controls in industries where market power 
existed, should this be deemed necessary.    
 
Although ‘lightly-regulated, the telecommunications sector was far from unregulated.  When 
the state-owned monopoly incumbent was privatised in 1990, contractual obligations known 
as the ‘Kiwi Share’ (subsequently the ‘Telecommunications Service Obligation’ or ‘TSO’) 
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imposed rural-urban and free local calling universal service obligations and a price cap on 
residential line rentals that could be broken only with the express permission of the Minister, 
and even then only where it could be demonstrated that the incumbent was under financial 
duress.  The paramount principle was that contractual agreement, rather than overt regulation, 
offered the most cost-effective means of advancing the pursuit of increased efficiency.  
 
The New Zealand arrangements thus constituted an action of a government endeavouring to 
create a set of principally competition law- and contractually-based governance arrangements 
that to some extent insulated the sector from the risks of diluting the pursuit of efficiency 
inherent in industry specific regulatory bodies and the risk of their political capture (albeit 
recognising that some redistributive imperatives remained in the universal service 
obligations). It is far from clear that the ‘light-handed’ New Zealand regime performed any 
worse over the 1990s than industry-specific regimes using efficiency gains as a benchmark.  
The New Zealand residential telephony price index fell by more than the OECD average over 
this period, and free residential dial-up internet telephony access led to the country becoming 
a world leader in internet connection and use (Howell, 2007).  Dynamic efficiency did not 
appear to be impaired, as the incumbent was one of the OECD’s earliest DSL adopters 
(January, 1999), using a high-speed (2Mbps) service widely available (85% of the population 
had access by 2003) priced very low taking speed into account (Howell, 2003).     
 
During the period of light-handed regulation, only two Commerce Act actions alleging 
exertion of a dominant position were brought against the incumbent – one by new entrant 
Clear Communications in 1991 (Clear case), and one by the Commerce Commission in 1999 
(0867 case).  In neither case was the incumbent found under competition law to be acting 
anti-competitively.  After hearings in the High Court2, Court of Appeal3 and Privy Council4, it 
was ultimately found in the Clear case that the incumbent’s adoption of the Baumol-Willig 
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) was legitimate as it enabled recovery of universal 
service costs.  In the 0867 case, the incumbent’s action in charging for internet traffic 
previously provided free of charge under the ‘Kiwi Share’ free residential local calling 
obligation when the receiving party was an ISP connected to a rival telephone network 
(previously approved by the Minister under the terms of the ‘Kiwi Share’) was a legitimate 
competitive action (Howell, 2007).   
 
                                                     
2 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation (1993) 5 TCLR 166 (HC)  
3 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation (1993) 5 TCLR413 (CA)  
4 Telecom Corporation v Clear Communications [1994] 5 NZBLC 103, 552 (PC); [1995] 1 NZLR 385 (PC) passim 
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2.2 ‘Light-Handed’, Politically-Mandated Industry-Specific Regulation 
The ‘light-handed’ competition law-governed regime prevailed until 2001, when following a 
change in government and a further Ministerial inquiry, it was replaced under the 
Telecommunications Act 2001 by by an industry-specific regulatory body – the Office of the 
Telecommunications Commissioner.   
 
Concerns had been raised following the Clear case (1994) that, although competition law had 
favoured the pursuit of increased efficiency in enabling recovery of universal service costs, 
the enshrining of ECPR pricing as a precedent risked, under certain circumstances, less than 
efficient entry and hence lower product variety in downstream markets (Economides & 
White, 1995; Blanchard, 1994a; 1994b, 1995).  That is, pursuing competition (the means) 
under competition law compromised efficiency (the end).  A proposed solution that avoided 
adoption of full industry-specific regulation was to introduce a ‘light-handed’ process that sat 
under the Commerce Act and the courts (e.g. an arbitration process) enabling swifter 
resolution of disputes and with a wider mandate to consider efficiency issues not directly part 
of court pleadings (Blanchard, 1995).  The proposal was rejected in favour of the status quo 
by a 1995 inquiry led by the New Zealand Treasury and the Ministry of Commerce 
(MoC/Treasury, 1995).  
 
However, ongoing discontent with ‘light-handed’ regulation provided a galvanising point for 
the political opposition of the time.   In part as an electoral response to entrants’ 
dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the 1991-4 court decisions and popular politicized 
perceptions of the ‘failure’ of the ‘light-handed’ regime to result in reductions in the 
(predominantly foreign-owned) incumbent’s market share (and hence its degree of 
dominance), and in part to differentiate its approach from both the previous Labour 
government that had introduced ‘light-handed’ regulation from 1984, and the subsequent 
National Party and National-led coalition governments that had endorsed it, the Labour Party 
manifesto for the 1999 election promised reforms to the Commerce Act to tighten controls on 
firms with a dominant position, and an inquiry into the conduct of both the 
telecommunications and electricity industries.  
 
Following the election of a Labour-led coalition government in November 1999, the 
telecommunications inquiry was duly established in February 2000.  The articulated 
government policy objective was “to ensure that the regulatory environment delivers cost 
efficient, timely, and innovative telecommunications services on an ongoing, fair and 
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equitable basis to all existing and potential users”5, which appeared to be interpreted by the 
Inquiry panel in efficiency-related terms.  ‘Cost-efficient’ was presumed to mean that services 
are produced “at the lowest cost and delivered to consumers at the lowest sustainable price” 
(p 11) (i.e. perfect productive and allocative efficiency), ‘timely’ to mean “the absence of 
barriers that would impede the implementation and uptake of innovative services” (dynamic 
efficiency) and ‘ongoing’ to mean “that regulation should be forward-looking, robust, durable 
and consistent over time, and not sacrifice long term gains for short-term considerations” (the 
trade-off between dynamic and static efficiency).   
 
However, the policy imposed multiple and conflicting objectives.  Both static and dynamic 
efficiency objectives were to be addressed simultaneously, with no guidance given to which 
should take priority.  Moreover, the policy required both efficiency and distributional 
objectives to also be simultaneously satisfied.  “Fair and equitable’ was taken to mean “the 
way in which services are provided, the conduct of the industry players and their 
interactions”, suggesting weight would be given to competitor equity as well as consumer 
welfare.  The policy was clearly unable to be delivered fully, and without clear prioritisation 
criteria, left open considerable scope for the Inquiry itself to be captured by vested interests. 
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the recommendations emerging reflected only partial satisfaction 
of multiple conflicting agendas. The new industry-specific regulator would be charged with 
overseeing implementation of cost-based (TSLRIC) pricing of a variety of fixed line voice 
telephony services, but stopped short of providing regulated open access to nascent broadband 
services.  Full local loop unbundling was also rejected, but a further inquiry into its feasibility 
was required to be undertaken by the end of 2003.  Whilst the inquiry recommended that the 
incumbent should bear all of the costs of universal service uncompensated, the legislation 
finally enacted facilitated the recovery of universal service costs from all industry 
participants, via a new ‘Telecommunications Service Order’ (‘TSO’) which replaced the 
‘Kiwi Share’.   
 
Importantly, however, in respect of the discretion afforded the regulator in undertaking 
inquiries into industry activity, the Act included a section 18(2) specifically mandating that 
efficiency be taken into account when making decisions and recommendations:  “in 
determining whether or not, or the extent to which, any act or omission will result, or will be 
likely to result, in competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of 
                                                     
5 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____16432.aspx#tor  
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end-users of telecommunications services within New Zealand, the efficiencies that will 
result, or will be likely to result, from that act or omission must be considered”.   
 
Despite the other provisions of the Act, it would appear from Section 18(2) that in the view of 
parliament, the efficiency objective remained important.  As the Commission was constituted 
within the Commerce Commission, an Independent Crown Entity required to take account of 
political directives only when specifically required to do so as part of its legislated duties, it 
might be considered that it satisfied the requirements for the hypothetical regulatory body 
identified in Section One above, charged with pursuing efficiency independent from risk of 
capture by vested (and especially political) interests.  Indeed, at the time it was seen as 
encompassing an ‘enlightened’ form of industry-specific regulation that “would still see New 
Zealand at very much the light-handed end of the regulatory spectrum, arguably the lightest 
within the OECD” (p 30).  However, the weakness of the arrangements lay in the fact that as 
an agent of political principals, the Commissioner could only recommend efficiency-based 
resolutions to matters investigated.  The power to accept or reject ultimately lay with the 
Minister, and hence the Commission’s activities were ultimately subject to political capture. 
 
2.3 The Efficiency Objective in Practice 
The enforceability and political acceptability of decisions made using the legislated efficiency 
mandate were explicitly tested when the Commission undertook its statutory (Section 64) 
review into local loop unbundling in 2003.   
 
2.3.1 LLU: Total Welfare Prevails 
The investigation was noteworthy internationally for the fact that it employed a cost-benefit 
analysis based upon a total welfare decision criterion (the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus as opposed to consumer welfare alone (Hausman & Sidak, 2005) – albeit subject to 
criticisms regarding the exclusion of investment in the model).  Dynamic efficiency principles 
were explicitly prioritised in making the recommendation ultimately not to proceed with 
unbundling.  The inquiry found that “the overall benefits from unbundling are not sufficiently 
persuasive to satisfy the Commission that a regulated solution is warranted”6.  Platform 
competition (e.g. from wireless networks) was considered likely to evolve and reduce the 
extent of the incumbent’s control of the bottleneck to access (para 788).   The experience of 
LLU internationally had been mixed in respect of increasing broadband penetration (para 
                                                     
6 Executive Summary, (v).  
http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/LocalLoopUnbundling/ContentFiles/Docu
ments/Finalreportexecutivesummary.PDF  
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792).  The high costs of mandatory unbundling were also cited, including the critical point 
that the incentives for the incumbent to invest would be substantially reduced under LLU, and 
that this would have very significant effects upon the potential welfare gains for consumers 
(para 794).  
 
Instead, the Commission recommended accepting the incumbent’s offer of open access to a  
limited bitstream service.  Given the incumbent’s imminent investment in a Next Generation 
Network (NGN), a lesser form of unbundled access would enable a limited amount of service-
differentiated entry, whilst preserving the incumbent’s investment incentives and limiting 
entrants’ exposure to stranded assets in the event of the NGN resulting in the bypass of 
exchanges containing entrants’ equipment (Gans & King, 2004; Covec, 2004; Howell, 2007).   
 
The Minister accepted the Commission’s recommendations, apparently endorsing both the 
methodology used and the conclusions reached.  For this decision, at least, industry-specific 
regulation constrained by an explicit efficiency obligation had resulted in an economically 
rational regulatory recommendation, and there appeared to be insufficient political will to 
override it. The decision was, however, received with considerable dismay by the 
incumbent’s competitors and other interested parties, who would undoubtedly have preferred 
a different outcome7.   The recommendation confirmed the apparent ability of vested interests 
to deviate the regulator from efficiency-based decision-making.  The nature of submissions to 
the Minister on the subject by disaffected industry participants signalled an intention that in 
future lobbying would be concentrated in the political arena, thereby increasing the pressure 
on a less well-informed decision-maker substantially more susceptible to acting 
opportunistically to resile from the efficiency criterion in future decisions.   
 
2.2.2 Mobile Termination #1: Consumer Welfare Trumps Total Welfare 
The second test came with the Commission’s inquiry into mobile termination between 2004 
and 2006.  In the initial inquiry, dynamic efficiency considerations underpinned the cost-
benefit analysis which led to a recommendation in June 2005 that mobile termination charges 
for voice calls on 2G networks, but not 3G networks, be regulated.  The recommendation 
stated: “the Act does not direct the Commission as to the weight that it should give to 
efficiencies, as opposed to other considerations. This is a matter for the Commission to 
consider. Where there are tensions between short-term allocative efficiency and long-term 
dynamic efficiency, the Commission takes the view that giving greater weight to the latter 
will generally better promote competition for the long-term benefit of end-users” (para 28).  
                                                     
7 See, for example, TelstraClear’s submission to the Minister on the matter http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/5898/tcl-rsp-to-
comcom-llu-rpt-submission040209.pdf  
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Nonetheless, greater weight was given to distributional considerations in this recommendation 
than in the LLU case, with consumer welfare, rather than total welfare, providing the decisive 
criterion.   
 
In August 2005, the Minister rejected Commission’s recommendation and ordered a second 
review reconsidering “definitional and implementation issues concerning 2G and 3G” and 
take into consideration “commercial offers made by Telecom and Vodafone following the 
Commission’s final report”8.  The Ministerial redirection appears to confirm that lobbying of 
politicians (rather than the regulator) by vested interests was now the preferred method of 
influencing sector outcomes.    
 
2.2.3 Mobile Termination #2: Competition Trumps Efficiency 
The second report in April 2006 this time recommended that all fixed-to-mobile voice calls 
on all technology types be subject to regulation9 as “substantial net benefits to end users were 
likely to arise from making mobile termination a designated access service” (para 32)10.   The 
redistributive consumer welfare decision criterion was defended: “where wealth transfers 
which are sustainable and not themselves conducive to inefficiency are likely to result from a 
measure promoting competition, the Commission ought to give weight to such transfers in the 
cost-benefit analysis” (para 34).   The inclusion of 3G technologies was justified as 
deployment had advanced between the first and second decisions to the extent that the 
Commission considered existing 3G investments to be irreversible.   
 
More surprising, though, was the explicit rejection of the supremacy of efficiency in the 
Commission’s primary decision-making criterion in favour of competition considerations – a 
substantial change from the dynamic efficiency criterion prioritised in the first report. The 
Commission argued that its statutory authority actually prioritised the pursuit of competition 
as the prevailing sector objective over all other considerations.    
 
Specifically, the Commission claimed that the Telecommunications Act created a distinction 
between the Commerce Act seeking to promote competition by restricting the aggregation of 
market power and controlling its use (sections 36 and 47), and the regulation of existing 
market power, as provided for in Part IV.  Part IV was deemed to focus upon the net benefit 
to acquirers – that is, it must take into account “the wealth transfer that occurs in reducing the 
                                                     
8http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/MobileTerminationRates/ContentFiles/Do
cuments/Ministers%20letter%20to%20commission.pdf  
9http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/MobileTerminationRates/reportsandsubmi
ssions.aspx  
10Paragraph references relate to the final, revised report, which summarises the material in all of the preceding draft and final 
reports.   
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excessive profits of the regulated party” (para 46) – an apparent acknowledgement of 
redistribution as the primary purpose of this specific regulatory intervention, as opposed to 
the pursuit of increased efficiency.  As the Telecommunications Act was deemed to derive as 
a consequence of Part IV-type dominance, the Commission was in no doubt that in addressing 
the tension between the promotion of competition (the means) and the pursuit of efficiency 
(the end),  the Telecommunications Act gave primacy to competition: “where there is a 
tension between the net public benefits and promotion of competition, the statutory context 
indicates that the primary consideration is the promotion of competition” (para 47).  A 
paragraph later: “the Telecommunications Act is focused on regulating access to promote 
competition. It does not provide a mechanism that specifically allows for efficiency 
considerations to take precedence over the promotion of competition.  Nor is there anything in 
the statutory scheme to suggest that this should be the case”.   
 
The implication of this decision is the surprising conclusion that in New Zealand, 
telecommunications regulation is not an alternative to competition law as presumed by the 
theory of section one above, but is in fact and in practice subservient to it.  If this was truly 
the intention when the Telecommunications Act was passed in 2001, it begs the question of 
why the efficiency mandate in section 18(2) was included at all.  Indeed, it would have been 
more consistent to instead have a clause prioritising the pursuit of competition alone.  
Moreover, the further implication is that all of the previous Commission decisions prioritising 
efficiency were based upon an erroneous interpretation of the government’s intentions when 
passing the Act, and that Ministerial acceptance of the 2003 unbundling decision made on this 
basis was therefore an error of process.  In the historical context, this view is perplexing given 
that the Act derived so directly from an Inquiry which gave explicit voice to (if not fully 
implementing) efficiency considerations in making its recommendations.  Moreover, the 
interpretation  is also highly questionable in historical fact – if the legal position was so clear, 
why at the time of the 2003 unbundling decision was judicial review of the minister’s 
(apparently legally erroneous) decision to accept the Commissioner’s recommendation not 
sought by any of the dissatisfied industry parties?    
 
2.2.4 Politicians Trump Regulators 
The most plausible alternative explanation for the radical departure from previous decision-
making precedents is that the prevailing political objectives changed between the passing of 
the Act in 2001 and the 2006 mobile termination decision.  As an agent of the political 
principals, the Commission appears to have become subject to pressures to resile from its 
previous prioritisation of efficiency in favour of a set of more politically acceptable 
competition-based criteria.  An acknowledgement of subservience to the Minister is contained 
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in the second report: “the role of the Commission is to recommend and it is for the Minister to 
determine” (para 53).   Ultimately, even the second recommendation was rejected in 200711, 
in favour of a set of undertakings by the potentially-regulated firms brokered by the Minister 
of Economic Development12 (the Minister of Communications having declared a conflict of 
interest as a consequence of a legal dispute with one of the companies facing regulation).     
 
2.4 Completion of the Transfer to Political Control 
The prioritisation of competition over efficiency as it has occurred in New Zealand is 
consistent with the hypothesis that indiscriminate prioritisation of competition (and especially 
its short-term static elements) over efficiency is likely when poorly-informed politician 
principals ‘captured’ by vested interests themselves capture and override the efficiency-
charged regulatory process for electoral purposes.  Competition metrics offer more tangible 
evidence to electoral stakeholders that actions have been undertaken than the less-tangible 
efficiency metrics.  Such reasoning leads to the hypothesis that lobbying by vested interests 
(either industry-based or electoral) has succeeded in reducing both the exercise of informed 
regulatory discretion and the power of the efficiency directive in New Zealand 
telecommunications markets..    
 
The available New Zealand evidence supports the contention that political overriding of the 
efficiency objectives for electoral ends has occurred.  The Labour Party manifesto for the 
September 2005 general election proclaimed “this Labour-led government has ended the 
destructive period of ultra-light handed regulation that stifled competition, growth and 
consumer choice in ICT markets” and promised to “closely monitor and enforce 
commitments made by Telecom New Zealand13 under the local loop unbundling decisions 
and ensure targets for broadband uptake for the next three years as outlined in the Digital 
Strategy are met” 14.    The election resulted in a minority Labour-led government with a one-
member majority.  The primacy of competition as the prevailing political objective for the 
sector was reinforced by the November speech from the throne outlining the new 
government’s agenda: “with respect to ICT, my government will be advancing policies to 
ensure that the telecommunications sector becomes more competitive and that we achieve 
faster broadband uptake in line with our competitors”15. ‘Efficiency’ appears to have 
                                                     
11 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29126
12 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DoumentID=28525
13 The incumbent 
14 http://www.labour.org.nz/policy/jobs_and_economy/2005policy/Pol05-Comms/index.html  
15 http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0511/S00104.htm (Despite successive attempts in June 2007 to retrieve the official version 
from http://www.dia.govt.nz/Pubforms.nsf/NZGZT/Speech187Nov05.pdf/$file/Speech187Nov05.pdf , it could not be retrieved.).  
This source appears to have reproduced the text complete, but this fact cannot be verified.    
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disappeared entirely from both the government’s telecommunications policy lexicon and the 
implementation of the policy itself.  
 
In December 2005, the Ministry of Economic Development began a ‘Stocktake’ of the 
telecommunications industry, with its primary focus “the broadband market and our 
broadband performance as a factor in economic performance” (MED, 2006).  Given that the 
expertise to undertake the investigation lay principally in the Telecommunications 
Commission, the use of policy ministry to undertake an assessment of industry performance 
implies a lack of political confidence in the Commission and its processes.  It also suggests a 
lack of confidence in the ability of a Commission-led analysis “taking account of” efficiency 
to deliver a set of recommendations consistent with the government’s explicit competition 
agenda to which it was already committed.    It also cannot be discounted that the Ministry 
was preferred for conducting the review specifically because, unlike the Commission, it is not 
explicitly bound by a requirement even to take account of efficiency in its analyses.  
Moreover, the Ministry, as distinct from an Independent Crown Entity, is directly accountable 
to the Minister for implementing government policy.  
 
In sharp contrast to the Commission reports, the Stocktake report (MED, 2006), released in 
May 2006, is notable for its lack of principled economic analysis (Howell, 2006).  Full local 
loop unbundling and functional separation of the incumbent were justified primarily on the 
basis of the broadband market failing to meet an arbitrary level of competitiveness defined by 
the share of connections sold by competitors to the incumbent16 and investment by the 
incumbent being deemed insufficient on the basis of slippage from an investment schedule 
proposed in 2003.  Submissions on the proposals were heard by a Select Committee 
comprised of generalist politicians rather than a panel of expert Commerce Commissioners, 
and were not subject to the three-stage Telecommunications Commission processes of a draft 
report, a quasi-court conference where the recommendations and written submissions on the 
draft report by all interested parties can be tested in a contestable manner, and a final report.  
The process was not subject to appeal or review on either process or substance. 
 
The recommendations were enacted in December 2006.  Along with the provisions for full 
LLU and separation, a new section (19A) was added requiring the Commission to take 
account of any economic policies of the government that are communicated by the Minister in 
                                                     
16 On February 2 2006, the Commissioner notified the Minister of Communications that at the end of 2005, whilst the number of 
ADSL broadband connections sold exceeded the target set in the 2005 agreement with Telecom by 11.6%, only 24.5%, rather 
than 33.3% had been sold by competitors to Telecom.   
http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/MonitoringandReporting/ContentFiles/Documents/Telco
%20Key%20Stats%20-%20Quarterly%20Monitoring%20Report%20-%2031%20March%202007.pdf
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writing.  Any veneer of independence of the New Zealand telecommunications regulatory 
function from political direction has thus been explicitly removed.  There is now considerable 
role confusion between the Ministry and the Commission as to where the responsibility for 
each of regulatory decision-making and policy delivery actually lies.  As the efficiency 
mandate was not removed, the new policy delivery obligation compounds the problem of the 
Commission’s multiple, conflicting priorities rather than clarifying its objectives. Moreover, 
the policy directive creates a further tension if, in the future, government economic policies 
change again in a manner that brings them into conflict even with the competition imperative 
(e.g. nationalization of assets).   Indeed, it begs the question of what purpose now exists for a 
regulatory body separate from the Ministry, if the very motivations for separation – 
independence and the ability of the Commissioner to exercise discretion – can be so explicitly 
suborned to political direction. 
 
Political capture of the regulatory function was reinforced in 2007.  In April, the Minister of 
Communications released proposals for the functional separation of the incumbent.  In May, 
at the same time as he announced the appointment of a new Commissioner, he revealed that 
he, and not the Commissioner, would lead the separation process.  This was deemed by the 
Cabinet to “the urgency attached by the government to the need to secure a clear outcome on 
this matter in the shortest possible timeframe. Because this is a major structural issue and not 
a matter of micro regulation, this was felt and is still felt to be the appropriate way forward” 
17.    
 
3. Conclusion 
The New Zealand case supports the hypothesis that, although it is theoretically possible to 
construct a regulatory body charged with pursuing an efficiency-based agenda, in practice the 
such a regulatory body will prevail only so long as the pursuit of efficiency is aligned with the 
interests of the prevailing political principals.   
 
The unique New Zealand institutional structure appears to have evolved because the explicit 
attempts by governments in the past to create arrangements that prioritised the pursuit of 
efficiency above other considerations, first by the reliance upon competition law alone, and 
subsequently by explicitly including efficiency objectives in the mandate given to the  
industry-specific regulator, have ultimately failed to withstand the test of subsequent 
governments to firstly dilute the force of the efficiency mandate, and ultimately to capture the 
                                                     
17 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29595  
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regulatory process as a means of furthering their own agendas.   The erosion of the efficiency 
mandate began gradually, but has accelerated since 2005.  Nonetheless, a complete 
transformation has been achieved within a comparatively short (in institutional terms – 
Williamson, 1996) twenty year time frame.   
 
The chronology of the erosion illustrates the thesis that, despite the best of intentions, 
ultimately the governance arrangements are determined by those with the political power to 
make the laws allocating responsibility for various tasks.  Whilst pursuit of efficiency is 
rationally justifiable from an economic perspective, and it has been demonstrated to be the 
objective of, if not perfectly achievable via, competition law, explicit inclusion of efficiency 
in a regulatory objective is not sustainable on the long-run, as the inability of an objective 
regulator to satisfy the petitions of those seeking to capture the process for their own purposes 
creates pressure for the law-maker politicians.  The supremacy of the efficiency criterion will 
persist only as long as it is congruent with the political objectives of the government of the 
day.   Governments change, and their objectives change with them.  Inevitably and 
eventually, in the absence of the ability to exercise control informally to capture the process, a 
successor government which cannot be bound by its predecessors will reverse earlier 
decisions, using its powers to either change the rules or to take over the regulatory task itself.  
The only reason that the courts administering competition law can avoid such capture is 
because their constitutional origins afford them a degree of independence not available to 
agencies that derive their mandate from political processes.   
 
Given the lack of ability to enforce an efficiency objective in the long-run via industry-
specific regulation, the only sustainable means of doing so would appear to be via 
competition law.  Imperfect though its process may be, the New Zealand experiment suggests 
that, in the absence of constitutional protections for a regulatory agency also charged with the 
pursuit of efficiency, it may be the only sustainable institutional compromise.   
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